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Abstract 
This thesis examines the possibilities for feminism that arise from the work of 
Michel Foucault, which I explicate by comparison it with humanist 
existentialism. I begin with The Second Sex, Simone de Beauvoir's application of 
existentialism to women. I expose the problems that arise in Beauvoir's project. 
Woman's body is an obstacle to her transcendence, and further, she must abandon 
her feminine desires and values, and accommodate herself to masculine patterns 
if she is to overcome her immanence and subordination. To understand why such 
problems recur in The Second Sex, I turn to Sartre's Being and Nothingness. 
After examining the conceptions underlying his thought, I conclude that his 
philosophy is unable to encompass difference, and is therefore antithetical to 
the feminist project.  
Foucault's philosophy offers solutions to these problems by eliminating 
consciousness as universal subject of action, and by making subjectivity a 
product of time, through showing how subjects are formed though the changing 
effects of power upon bodies. His thought encompasses difference at a 
fundamental level, through understanding human beings as particular 'events' in 
time. I argue that Foucault's philosophy does not depend fundamentally, as does 
Sartre's, upon woman as Other.  
Foucault shows how our particular historical form of rationality, created within 
power relations, sets limits on what we can think, be and do. He shows how 
thought can overcome some of these limits, allowing us to become authors of our 
own actions. Misunderstandings are common, particularly of his conception of 
power and its relation to subjectivity. Many commentators demand changes that 
reinstate the concepts he fundamentally rejects. Others do not see the unity of 
his philosophy. I show its importance to women's emancipation and to a feminist 
ethics.  
Finally, I compare Foucault's thought with feminism of difference. With the help 
of Heidegger, I argue that Foucault offers a superior but complementary way to 
know who we are, through understanding the history of our making. I show how the 
masculine and the feminine can be reconciled through a reconceptualisation of 
the relation of sex to time. All told, Foucault is a philosopher of freedom and 
for him the practice of freedom is an ethics.  
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For man has closed himself up, til he sees all things through 
narrow chinks of his cavern.  
William Blake,  
The Marriage of Heaven and Hell, 
 'A Memorable Fancy' 
 
Simone de Beauvoir and Michel Foucault might seem a rather odd couple, and in 
many respects this is indeed so. It is unlikely that Foucault ever read The Second 
Sex. If he had, perhaps he would have been amused to see that Sartre's 
existentialism, which he opposed, could not be successfully applied to one half of 
humanity, despite Beauvoir's most strenuous efforts. I say it is unlikely because 
Foucault was not one to touch upon feminist issues, except rarely - and then often 
ineptly. Still, Beauvoir and Foucault had in common a very strong and central 
concern for human freedom as an ethical endeavour. Both believed that freedom 
and ethics were intimately linked, and that the achievement of an ethical 
existence required active effort rather than passive acceptance. But even in these 
similarities they had essential differences, and it is the significance of these 
differences for women's freedom that I want to show here. 
This thesis is intended to serve two purposes. On the one hand, it is 
concerned with the possibilities for feminism that arise from the work of Michel 
Foucault. This is presented as a critique of and an alternative to humanism, and, 
in particular, to the existentialist argument of Simone de Beauvoir in The Second 
Sex. I argue that Foucault's theory offers solutions, not only to the problems of 
The Second Sex, but to some longstanding problems in feminist theory and 
practice. 
On the other hand, it is intended to serve a somewhat similar purpose to the 
personal notebooks of ancient Greece, the hypomnemata, which, according to 
Foucault, were collections of writings to be used for the project of making oneself 
differently. Quite unlike the modern use of writing with the object of discovering 
who one really is, this knowledge was accumulated towards achieving certain 
ideals. The aim was to become a person who, rather than being governed by 
exterior forces or the power of others, was self-governed. Of course this thesis is 
not personal in the same way as the hypomnemata but, somewhat in the same 
spirit, it is an argument meant to facilitate change - towards women (and men) 
making themselves differently, and becoming self-constituting and self-governing 
- and towards change in feminist directions and practices.  
 
2
The hypomnemata did include knowledge of the self, not for modern 
therapeutic purposes but as a necessary basis for making oneself differently. A 
large part of the thesis is devoted to understanding and criticising some of the 
ideas from which feminism has been constructed. This need to know what we are 
in order to become something else is why I begin this 'archaeology' with an 
investigation of The Second Sex. This, of course, is only one source of present-
day feminism, but Simone de Beauvoir is known as 'the mother of us all' for good 
reason. Many beliefs similar to hers continue to be incorporated in important and 
influential sections of feminist thought and practice today. Her work also 
participates in a particular philosophical movement, humanist existentialism, 
which was strongly repudiated by a later generation which included Foucault, 
whose work I investigate in the third and fourth chapters of my 'hypomnemata'. 
For a reader unfamiliar with existentialist thought, The Second Sex is a 
puzzling book, and it is Beauvoir's ambivalences and contradictions that I bring to 
light in chapter one. Perhaps the most significant example of this for feminism is 
her ambivalence towards the female body. For example, she doubts that 
pregnancy can ever be more than a second-rate activity, but also insists that the 
facts of the body have no significance until they are given meaning. There are 
other puzzles as well. Although few feminists would deny that serving others and 
economic dependency has allowed men to oppress women, it is not clear why 
Beauvoir links this so sweepingly to the notion of transcendence over the given, 
why she despises women's traditional work in the home, why women are blamed 
for their oppressed state, or why they must be 'assimilated', to become like men.  
The key to such puzzles lies in the philosophical basis of Beauvoir's work, 
but, since she herself does not explain this in any detail, it is necessary to  turn to 
the work where it is spelled out - Jean-Paul Sartre's  Being and Nothingness. In 
chapter two, then, I investigate the obstacles to finding a means of emancipating 
woman through a humanist philosophy, despite the fact that this is a philosophy 
preoccupied with freedom. I conclude that these problems are very serious - that 
in fact Sartre's philosophy in Being and Nothingness cannot embrace women's 
emancipation, and that a very different philosophical outlook is needed if this is 
to be achieved.  
In restricting my study of Beauvoir and Sartre almost entirely to The Second 
Sex and Being and Nothingness, my aim is to separate out the core aspects of 
these works that are antithetical to women's emancipation and to an ethical 
feminism. My object has been to present a type of thought, rather than to present 
a general overview of the work of these two philosophers.1 As will become clear, 
my own theoretical inclination is anti-humanist, but I do not deny that their work 
                                                 
1. There is a very large literature giving broad overviews of Sartre. Dominick LaCapra (1987) 
gives a fair and penetrating assessment.  
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was an advance towards understanding human being as constituted in the world, 
and that in the cause of liberation it has been inspiring to many.  
In my view it is unfortunate that Beauvoir finally gave too little weight to her 
view that humans are not natural beings and are not isolated individuals, but 
make their choices, act and so construct their identities within the general social 
framework (EA:71). This is particularly so considering that she herself shows in 
The Second Sex how influential and complex are the social forces within which 
woman constructs herself.2 On the question of respect for an 'older sister', I cannot 
do better than quote Irigaray: 
To respect Simone de Beauvoir is to follow the theoretical and practical work for social 
justice that she carried out in her own way; it is to maintain the liberating horizons which 
she opened up for  many women, and men .... She certainly found part of her inspiration 
for these during her long and often solitary walks in the countryside, in nature. It seems to 
me that her concern for and writings on this subject are a message not to be forgotten 
(1993:13-14).3 
 
       Foucault was a member of a generation of philosophers who constructed 
their thought in direct response to the humanist existentialism of which Jean-Paul 
Sartre was probably the leading French exponent, and so the link between 
Beauvoir and Foucault is Sartre. It is not surprising, then, that the same problems 
that I find in The Second Sex and in Being and Nothingness are addressed by 
Foucault. I explain his approach and how he solves these problems in chapters 
three and four. It is in this part of the thesis that the more constructive aspect of 
my 'hypomnemata' begins to be revealed, through Foucault's suggestions for how 
we might conceive of ourselves and the world differently. 
For clarity, I divide my writing on Foucault into two parts, although these are 
in fact interdependent. In general, chapter three deals with the relations between 
self and exterior world, at the same time defining what that self is. For Foucault, 
the human subject is made within culturally specific forms of knowledge and 
practice, themselves forged through the operation of power relations. Although 
there is now considerable familiarity with this aspect of his work, 
                                                 
2. Feminists have hotly disputed at great length over The Second Sex. Toril Moi (1994) strives to 
defend Beauvoir against her critics, whom she feels have been 'far more hostile than might 
reasonably be expected' and have allowed their 'preconceptions or prejudices to shape their 
perceptions' (1994:77). I disagree if, as sometimes is the case, Moi considers a different 
philosophical stance to be 'prejudice'. See, for example, Moi's caricature of Irigaray's position on 
Beauvoir (Moi 1994:183; Irigaray 1993:10-14). It is not, as Moi believes, that Beauvoir's critics 
generally misrecognise her project and judge her by an 'alien standard'; rather the project is 
recognised and found wanting as a means of liberation (Moi 1994:184). 
3. Sartre later tried to recognize the influence upon the individual of the social world, and of 
language, more fully. This change in his thought became obvious after Beauvoir's publication of 
The Second Sex (see, for example, Silverman, 1980), and was possibly influenced by her 
difficulties in applying it to women.  
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misunderstanding is not uncommon, particularly of his particular conception of 
power and its relation to subjectivity. Many commentators praise aspects of his 
work yet demand improvements or additions that reinstate the very concepts that 
he fundamentally rejects. Perhaps the best example of this is his rejection of the 
transparent, self-reflexive, constituting subject, a loss bewailed by critics, in their 
concern for agency. For them, it is an either/or question: either humans constitute 
themselves and the world or they are constituted by it. As they see it, this 
constituting subject is the source of independent thought and action and its loss 
means that human beings have lost all freedom to act independently, a serious 
problem for social theorists concerned with freedom. Another example is a 
demand for the normative guidance which Foucault so studiously avoids 
providing. Since I insist that Foucault's work should not be seen as divided 
between the 'useful' earlier genealogical material on discipline and bio-power, and 
the later material on the aesthetics of the self that can blithely be rejected, I aim to 
show how the two parts are connected, and the importance of both to women's 
emancipation and to ethics. At the conclusion of this chapter, I argue that from 
Foucault's understanding that there is no ultimate truth of human being it follows 
logically that an ethical relation to the other must be concerned with difference.  
Chapter four deals with the second of the two sets of relationships involved in 
the question of women's freedom, the internal relation of power between self and 
self, the way that we act upon our own actions. Foucault agrees with Beauvoir 
and Sartre that we cannot be free if we are at the mercy of the beliefs, emotions 
and desires which have been created in us without our knowledge or consent. For 
him, the tyrant and the slave are both not free and not ethical subjects (1988:8). 
However, unlike Beauvoir and Sartre, Foucault avoids making individuals 
culpable for their own plight or for the state of the world. Avoiding moral 
persuasion, he moves beyond the concept of good and evil, considering instead 
what is good for us and what is bad. He suggests that we seek freedom through 
actively taking part in the making of ourselves, that we intentionally construct 
ourselves as 'works of art'. I argue, against critics who take this to be a move 
towards egotistical and frivolous self-indulgence, that this constitutes an ethical 
relation to self which is the ground of possibility of an ethical relation to others. 
Foucault is a philosopher of freedom and for him the practice of freedom is an 
ethics.  
In my concluding chapter, I discuss what my understanding of Foucault 
means for feminist theory and practice today. I look critically at the feminist 
pursuit of identity for women in terms of an essential difference. I conclude that 
feminism of difference uses concepts of identity and representation that come 
uncomfortably and unnecesarily close to the humanist oppositional thought that 
has subordinated us in the modern era. I argue that this is not a good strategy. 
There are other ways of knowing who we are, and Foucault offers a better 
alternative. It is better for women to understand themselves as particular beings in 
time - as creatures of history. This, I argue, not only frees women of the 
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oppositional form of representation in which we are caught, but also frees us to 
become authors of ourselves.  
Finally, to throw some positive light upon how we might make our freedom, I 
turn first to Heidegger, one of Foucault's acknowledged mentors, to heighten and 
sharpen our understanding of Foucault's thought. Heidegger offers a depth of 
understanding of man's relation to time which Foucault has taken up, but which is 
difficult of access without reference to Heidegger. Through Heidegger's 
conceptions of dwelling and Being, I reinforce the importance of Foucault's 
emphasis upon the practise of genealogy - of knowing who we are through 
knowing how we have been made in time. I also consider what it is that women 
might seek in making themselves differently. Then, through a reflection upon the 
relation of the masculine and the feminine to time, I draw out the essential part 
played by the concept of time in Foucault's thought. Through this, I summarise 
what Foucault can tell us about the problem of the relation between the sexes in 




The problem of freedom versus cultural determinism that has been grappled with 
by feminist thinkers from Beauvoir to the present day. ‘Why is woman so 
submissive?’ was Beauvoir’s testy question. As Judith Butler puts this, 'how are 
we to understand the constitutive and compelling status of gender norms without 
falling into the trap of cultural determinism?' (Bodies that Matter, p. x). Foucault 
suggests that when we are faced with an impossible question such as this we 
should sidestep it. The cultural is a product of time. It is through considering the 
relation of gender to time that the impasse of determinism can be forestalled. 
 
Situating human being in time has great ethical effects: no longer can we appeal 
to the higher authority of God, precedent, or Man for direction. Many find this is 
a disturbing prospect, but I will show that it is, rather, a great opportunity for 
freedom and for choosing ethical practices that apply effectively to the particular 
dilemmas of our present time.   
   
 
